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W.: Recovery of Insurance When Beneficiary Causes Death of Insured
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
RECOVERY OF INSURANCE WHEN BENEFICIARY

CAUSES DEATn

OF INSURED.-It is a well established principle that a beneficiary

cannot maintain an action for insurance proceeds after having
murdered the insured.' West Virginia has a statute which provides
that no person who has been convicted of feloniously killing
another another shall take or acquire as beneficiary of an insurance
2
policy any interest in the property of his victim.
Although the statute dearly bars a beneficiary convicted of
voluntary manslaughter or murder (both being felonious killings)
from taking the proceeds of the insurance policy, it establishes no
rule in regard to nonfelonious killings or felonious killings in
which no conviction has been obtained. This note will deal with
these and related problems.
The key to the various problems connected with the statute
is contained in a determination of whether the statute establishes
conviction of a felonious killing as the sole case in which a beneficiary is precluded from obtaining the proceeds of a policy.
Although the West Virginia court has not yet ruled upon this
point, it indicated in a dictum that the statute merely has supplemented the common law and gives no implication that a lesser
verdict would furnish the basis for recovery.3 At least one other
4
court has endorsed this view in construing a similar statute.
Since the West Virginia court is very likely to adopt the rule
that the statute merely supplements the common law, 5 it is necessary to look to the law in existence prior to the enactment of the
statute to determine whether other homicides by the beneficiary,
not involving the elements of felonious killing, would bar him from
recovery of the insurance proceeds. Most courts recognize the
common law test barring recovery as being an unlawful intentional
causation of the death of the insured. In a dictum the West
Virginia court adopted the "unlawful, intentional" test, but qualified it by adding the words, "whether felonious or not.' 7 The
qualifications added are of little importance inasmuch as a killing

"Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865 (1919).
See Wade, Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing Another, 49 HARV. L. REv.
715 (1936).
2W. VA. CODE c. 42, art. 4, § 2 (Michie, 1949).
3 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 518, 177 S.E. 188,
189 (1934).
4 Smith v. Todd, 155 S.E. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930).
See Comment, 41 W. VA. L.Q. 288 (1935).
a Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shane, 98 Ark. 132, 135 S.W. 836 (1911);
see Coouny, BRIEFS ON INSURANCME 5227 (2d ed. 1927).

7 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 518, 177 S.E. 188,
189 (1934).
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which is unlawful and intentional, but not felonious, is not conceivable."
An examination of the cases shows that the courts have been
uniform in allowing recovery where the killing did not amount to
an unlawful intentional homicide. Recovery was allowed where
death was caused by an insane beneficiary,9 by a beneficiary acting
in self-defense, 10 and under circumstances amounting to involuntary
manslaughter." It appears unlikely then that the West Virginia
court would bar a beneficiary found to be guilty of only a nonfelonious killing from obtaining the proceeds of an insurance
policy.
Analogous to the nonfelonious killing is the problem of
whether the statute requires a conviction of the beneficiary. This
question is most likely to arise where the beneficiary murders the
insured and then commits suicide. Such a factual situation was
faced by the South Carolina court in Smith v. Todd.12 It was held
that the statute merely raised the conviction of murder as a conclusive bar to the beneficiary's right to recover. The statute did
not abrogate the common law principle that the beneficiary could
be denied recovery on grounds of not being allowed to profit from
his wrong, notwithstanding the fact that no conviction had been
obtained. At least one court has taken a contrary view, the Kansas
court holding that a similar statute required conviction."
The West Virginia court has not yet ruled upon this point.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill,1 4 however, it held that the

statute raises conviction of a felonious killing as a conclusive bar
to the recovery of insurance proceeds in a civil action. Conviction
of a lesser criminal offense, however, is not conclusive and the record
of such conviction is not proper evidence in the civil action.", The
conclusiveness of the felonious killing conviction establishes a
statutory exception to the rule that a judgment in a criminal case
is not proper evidence in a civil suit to prove facts on which it is
based. 1 The latter rule is applicable to either conviction or
acquittal of the beneficiary in a criminal proceeding. In cases
8 Involuntary manslaughter is not an intentional killing. See State v.
Weisengoff, 85 W. Va. 271, 284, 101 S.E. 450 (1919).
9 Holdom v. Ancient Order, 159 Ill. 619, 43 N.E. 772 (1895).
LOHutcherson v. Sovereign Camp W.O.W., 112 Tex. 551, 251 S.W. 491 (1923).
lSchreiner v. High Court, 35 Ili. App. 576 (1890); Minasian v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 3 N.E.2d 17 (1936).
12 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506 (1930).
is Noller v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 142 Kan. 35, 46 P.2d 22 (1935).
'4 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (1934).
15 Ibid.

18 Interstate Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922).
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other than those where a conviction of a felonious killing has been
obtained, the civil court will determine for purposes of recovery on
the insurance policy whether or not the claimant was guilty. In
the civil action the fact that the beneficiary killed the insured
need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but a fair pre-ponderance of evidence is sufficient.1t
Another possible solution to the nonconviction problem is
through the application of the constructive trust doctrine. Applicable only where the slayer acquires property for which he may
be required by equity to account as trustee, the constructive trust
doctrine has been invoked extensively by the courts in cases
dealing with wills.' s It has been used sparingly in insurance cases,
although at least one writer credits the constructive trust doctrine
as being the basis for the insurance decisions:
"In the cases the couyts do not always speak of a constructive trust, or say in i'kplicit words that the murderer is
a constructive trustee of his1 claim on the policy. It seems
clear, however, that a constructive trust is the basis of the
result which is reached by the court."'"
The West Virginia court has not yet applied the constructive
trust doctrine to a nonconviction case of this sort. The court has
attributed, however, the result of Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
2 0
Co.
to a constructive trust doctrine. 21 An examination of the
facts and holding in the Johnson case, however, makes it doubtful
that the court did raise a constructive trust in that case. 22 The
most likely opportunity. which may arise for an application in the
future of a constructive trust doctrine is in the nonconviction situation. It appears unlikely that the court would apply the device
to a nonfelonious killing. At least one court has repudiated the
device in a nonfelonious killing, saying:
"If the maxim that no man shall profit from his own
wrong be applied literally, then the slightest negligence of
the beneficiary resulting in death of the insured would bar
recovery. Such a result would
be recognized generally as impracticable and unjust."2
Another problem raised by the statute is the disposition of
the proceeds of an insurance policy when the named beneficiary
17Jack v. Mutual Res. Fund Ass'n, 113 Fed. 49, 51 C.C.A. 36 (1902).
18 Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927).
103 SCoTT, TRUSTS 2405 (1939).
20 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865 (1919).
21 State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 109, 170 S.E. 909 (1933).
22 See Colson, Constructive Trusts in West Virginia, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 357,
362-363 (1939).
22 Minasian v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 295 Mass. 1, 5, 8 N.E.2d 17, 19 (1936).
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is ruled ineligible to take them. The statute provides that the
proceeds should go to the persons who would have taken them if
the beneficiary had been dead at the death of the insured. 24 The
proceeds then are to revert to the estate of the insured and are to be
taken by his next-of-kin. The heirs of the murderer are not
entitled to the property unless they are also the persons who would
have been heirs of the decedent if the murderer had predeceased
him.2 5 An assignee of the beneficiary likewise is barred from a
20
recovery of the proceeds of the policy.
The insurance company has been relieved of all liability under
the policy in several situations. Where death of the insured at
the hands of the beneficiary is an excepted risk in the policy, the
provision has been held valid and sufficient to relieve the insurer
of any duty of payment.27 The West Virginia court has allowed
the insurance company to retain the proceeds of the policy where
the beneficiary was the sole heir and distributee of the insured's
estate. 28 It has also denied the state the right to escheat the
proceeds of the policy in such a case, holding that the state is a
stranger to the insurance policy and has no equitable interest in
the insurance money. 29 The estate of the insured was denied
recovery where the beneficiary took out the policy and paid the
premiums5 0
_R.J.W.

RIGHT TO BILL OF PARTICULARS IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGs.-The problem as to whether the general principles of pleading might be applied in eminent domain proceedings recently has
been brought into focus by the many condemnation proceedings
instituted by the West Virginia Turnpike Commission to secure
the right of way for the turnpike currently under construction in
southern West Virginia. This note concerns one phase of the above
broad problem (as to whether the defendant can be required to
submit a bill of particulars showing the exact nature of his claim
for damages in his answer to the petition); but, in so particularizing
the discussion, perhaps elucidation can be gained as to the overall
question involved.
24 W. VA. CODE C. 42, art. 4, § 2 (Michie, 1949).
253 ScoT, TRUSTS 2382 (1939).
26 Johnson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S.E. 865 (1919).
27 McDade v. Mystic Workers, 196 Iowa 857, 195 N.W. 603 (1928).
2
8Wickline v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 W. Va. 424, 145 S.E. 743
(1928).
29 State v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
114 W. Va. 109, 170 S.E. 909 (1933).
30 Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 152 N.C. 1, 67 S.E. 53 (1910).
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